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Abstract
Friedgut, Kalai, and Nisan have proved that social choice functions can
be successfully manipulated by random preference reordering with non-
negligible probability [FKN08]. However, their results require two restric-
tions: the social choice function must be neutral, and the election must have
at most 3 alternatives. In this thesis we focus on removing the latter restric-
tion and generalizing the results to elections with any number of candidates.
We also provide a survey of related work analyzing and comparing results
from a number of authors.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In this thesis we endeavor to extend the results of Friedgut, Kalai, and
Nisan [FKN08] who proved that social choice functions can be successfully
manipulated by random preference reordering with non-negligible probabil-
ity. However, there are two main restrictions on their results: the social
choice function must be neutral and the election must have at most 3 alter-
natives. We attempt to remove the later restriction in order to generalize
the results to elections with any number of candidates.
Our proof draws upon many aspects of Friedgut, Kalai, and Nisan’s
proof. Their proof is done in three steps, with the first two steps being al-
ready written in general terms, while the third is restricted to 3 alternatives.
Therefore we need only generalize the third step. We rely heavily on lattice
theory and combinatorics to prove this generalization.
1.1 Importance
It is obvious, and widely accepted that election systems are important to
society. They are essential to democracy, which is the foundation of many
nations’ governments, and are also used in many non-political situations—
anywhere a group of independent agents needs to come to a consensus.
They are used in schools, electing board members for a business, and stock
holders voting on issues affecting a company. Election systems are not even
wholly restricted to humans. Elections can be used by artificial intelligence
systems when a group of agents needs to make a decision [ER91, ER93,
PHG00, DKNS01, FKS03], and they can be used in internet page ranking
algorithms for search engines [CELM07]. Studying the stability of election
systems under noise can even be used to determine how resistant certain
1
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systems, e.g. network transfers, are to error [Sho08].
However, it is less clear that manipulation in elections—especially ran-
dom manipulation—is important, so we will attempt to describe its impor-
tance by briefly explaining the history behind its investigation.
One obvious criterion for a good election system is fairness [CDE+06],
and it is generally accepted that the winning candidate should, on the whole,
represent the will the constituents’. It is easy to recognize a fair election
system if there are only two candidates: the one preferred by the majority
of voters should win. But with a larger number of candidates, determining
the fairness of an election system is more difficult.
Marquis de Condorcet was one of the first people to study the issue of
fairness in election systems. He proposed that the winning candidate be
the candidate who would win a head-to-head election against each of the
other candidates, and such a winner is known as the Condorcet winner.
Unfortunately, Condorcet also proved that a Condorcet winner does not
always exist. Nevertheless, this criterion for fairness, called the Condorcet
criterion, was one of the first formal fairness criteria, and is still widely used
today.
In 1950, Kenneth Arrow, an American economist who was interested in
the fairness of social welfare functions, made a large contribution to the field
of social choice theory with his impossibility theorem [Arr50, Arr12]. This
theorem demonstrates that no social welfare function can “fairly” convert
the preferences of voters into a society-wide preference list, by showing that
no social welfare function can satisfy the following criteria (which will be
further described in the next chapter): unrestricted domain, independence
of irrelevant alternatives, unanimity, and non-dictatorship.
One of the great enemies of fairness in election systems is manipulation
(or strategic voting or tactical voting). Manipulation is when an individual
purposefully misrepresents his preferences, hoping to achieve a more favor-
able outcome in the election. One way to avoid manipulation would be to
devise a voting rule that is non-manipulable. Unfortunately, the Gibbard-
Satterthwaite theorem states that every voting rule that is not a dictator-
ship, and under which any alternative can win, is subject to manipulation
[Gib73, Sat75, DS00]. This means that we cannot make manipulation im-
possible via a cleverly devised voting rule.
In an attempt to circumvent the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, Bartholdi,
Tovey, and Trick studied the computational difficulty of finding a winner for
various voting rules. For example, they showed that the Dodgson method
mentioned above [Dod76] is actually infeasible to manipulate for the simple
reason that figuring out the winner of the election is NP-hard. Therefore,
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 3
it is not sufficient for a desirable voting rule to be hard to manipulate: it
must also be also be efficient to determine a winner.
Many others have followed in the vein of searching for a computational
barrier to manipulation, but the majority of these results deal with the
worst-case complexity of manipulation. In 2006, work by Conitzer and Sand-
holm [CS06] along with that of Procaccia and Rosenschein [PR06] showed
that while manipulation can be hard in the worst case, it is often much eas-
ier in the average case. In the next few years more work was done to make
this concern even more well-founded [PR07, EHRS07].
In 2008, Friedgut, Kalai, and Nisan [FKN08], instead of studying worst-
case manipulation, performed a probabilistic analysis of random manipu-
lation. That is, instead of a voter intelligently manipulating an election,
which can be difficult in terms of worst-case complexity, he simply chooses
his manipulation randomly (if his most preferred candidate is not already
winning). They proved that even a random manipulation will succeed with
non-negligible probability. This is significant because no matter how hard
it is to find a profitable manipulation in the worst-case, it is trivial to find
a random manipulation. If the probability of success of a random manipu-
lation is high enough, it could completely bypass the computational barrier
to manipulation. These are the results we hope to extend in the remainder
of this thesis.
1.2 Difficulty
The difficulty of this problem can be seen by recent work that generalizes
the results of Friedgut, Kalai, and Nisan. First, its difficulty can be seen by
Friedgut, Kalai, and Nisan themselves failing to generalize it, both in the
original paper [FKN08], and also later when they removed the neutrality
constraint [FKKN11]. If it were an easy task, they would have done it from
the outset.
In addition, other authors have done work along the same lines, but still
without coming up with a general result. In 2008 Xia and Conitzer were
able to prove a similar theorem for any number of candidates, but instead
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• Canceling out
• Stability
These conditions are formally defined and explained in Chapter 4: Re-
lated Work, and also by Xia and Conitzer themselves.
These conditions are stricter than the neutrality assumption of Friedgut,
Kalai, and Nisan, in the sense that they do not capture all of the “common”
voting rules, e.g. Bucklin.
Around the same time Dobzinski and Procaccia published complemen-
tary results for two voters and social choice functions satisfying unanimity
(the Pareto principle) [DP08]. They proved the following:
Theorem 1.2.1 (Dobzinski and Procaccia). Let f be a Pareto-optimal SCF
and let n = 2, m ≥ 3, and δ < 1
32m9
. If f is δ-strategyproof then f is 16m8δ-
dictatorial.
The fact that all of these authors worked on the same problem over
multiple years and were unable to achieve a general result speaks to its
difficulty.
1.3 Independent Work
Unfortunately for us, but fortunately for the field of social choice theory
as a whole, Isaksson, Kindler, and Mossel have, independently and during
the writing of this thesis, published a brilliant generalization of the original
theorem of Friedgut, Kalai, and Nisan and even improved slightly upon the
results [IKM10]. Translating their results into the terminology we have been
using, they proved that for a neutral social choice function f with m ≥ 4
alternatives and n voters that is ε-far from dictatorship, a uniformly chosen
profile will be manipulable with probability at least 2−1ε2n−4m−6(m!)−3.
Later Friedgut et al. removed the neutrality constraint from their original
theorem, and added an author [FKKN11].
Finally, Mossel and Rácz [MR12] took ideas from these two proofs and
created a unified proof with the same results as Isaksson, Kindler, and Mos-
sel, but without the neutrality constraint.
Though these results have independently achieved the goals we set out
with, we believe that our work is still useful. At the very least ours simply
stands as an alternate proof. However, our proof has the benefit that it uses
very similar techniques to those of the original proof by Friedgut, Kalai, and
Nisan, and additionally we believe that our proof is much simpler and more
easily understood.
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1.4 Proof Summary
Here we summarize our generalization and our main result, both for reference
and to act as an outline of our method. Some of this notation will be defined
in subsequent chapters, and might not be understood until then.
The proof we are generalizing is broken up into three steps. In the
original paper they are called Step 1, Step 2, and Step 3, and in [FKKN11]
they are called the following respectively:
Step 1: application of a quantitative version of Arrow’s impossibility the-
orem,
Step 2: reduction from an SCF with low dependence on irrelevant alterna-
tives to a GSWF with a low paradox probability,
Step 3: reduction from low manipulation power to low dependence on ir-
relevant alternatives,
In the original paper, Friedgut, Kalai, and Nisan were able to generalize
Step 1 and Step 2 as follows. For more explanation of the notation used by
Friedgut, Kalai, and Nisan see Section 4.1.1.
Lemma 1.4.1 (Generalized Step 1). For every fixed m and ε > 0 there exists
δ > 0 such that if F = f⊗(
m
2 ) is a neutral IIA GSWF over m alternatives
with f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}, and ∆(f,DICT ) > ε, then F has probability of at
least δ ≥ (Cε)bm/3c of not having a Generalized Condorcet Winner, where
C > 0 is an absolute constant.
Lemma 1.4.2 (Generalized Step 2). For every fixed m there exists δ > 0
such that for all ε > 0 the following holds. Let f be a neutral SCF among
m alternatives such that ∆(f,DICT ) > ε. Then for all (a, b) we have
Ma,b(f) ≥ δ.
Therefore, we focus on generalizing Step 3 so that together with the
already generalized Steps 1 and 2 we will have a generalized main theorem.
The original Step 3 was:
Lemma 1.4.3 (Non-General Step 3). For every SCF f on 3 alternatives
and every a, b ∈ A, Ma,b ≤
∑
iMi · 6
And the generalization we attempt to prove is:
Lemma 1.4.4 (Generalized Step 3). For every SCF f on m alternatives
and every a, b ∈ A, Ma,b ≤
∑
iMi ·m!
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When we put together all 3 generalized steps we get our main result:
Theorem 1.4.5 (Main Result). There exists a constant C > 0 such that
for every ε > 0 the following holds. If f is a neutral SCF for n voters






1.5 Structure of the Remaining Chapters
Chapter 2: Preliminaries. In the next chapter we introduce the prelim-
inaries, which include formal definitions and notation to serve as a
reference for use in the rest of the thesis. The preliminaries are often
elementary and provide a technical foundation for the following work.
Chapter 3: Background. Here we give some background information on
the field of social choice theory and describe how it has evolved, leading
to the problem we are addressing in this work.
Chapter 4: Related Work. In the related work chapter we describe, in
a moderate amount of detail, the results and methods of various other
authors relating both to this thesis, and to the work of Friedgut, Kalai,
and Nisan on which our work is based.
Chapter 5: Results. This is the technical portion of the thesis in which
we prove foundational lemmas and build up a proof of our main result.
Chapter 2
Preliminaries
In this chapter we present the formal definitions we will need for the rest
of this thesis. These serve as a reference as well as an introduction to the
technical work contained in the following chapters. Some definitions are
very basic and many will already be known to the reader; however, they are
stated explicitly here to provide maximum clarity and a solid foundation
upon which to present the rest of our work.
For additional definitions, which are out of the scope of this thesis, the
reader may refer to textbooks on set theory [Kun80] and lattice theory
[Bir95].
2.1 Definitions
We will begin with basic definitions regarding set theory and lattice theory,
and then towards the end of this section we will transition to definitions
from social choice theory.
Definition 2.1.1. A permutation of a set X is a bijective function from X
to X.
Definition 2.1.2. A total ordering over a set X is a binary relation on X
that is antisymmetric, transitive, and total.
Although technically speaking permutations and total orderings are dif-
ferent constructs (bijective functions versus binary relations), they often
have similar applications. For example, given a totally-ordered set X and a
permutation σ on X, we can construct a total ordering <R= {(x, y) | x, y ∈
X,σ−1(x) < σ−1(y)} which is structurally analogous to σ. Likewise, for any
7
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well-ordered set X and a total ordering <R over X, one could construct a
permutation σ from <R where σ : X → X such that σ(x) = y iff
|{z ∈ X | z < x}| = |{z ∈ X | z <R y}|.
For countable sets we will sometimes view permutations and total orders
as sequences, using a subscript notation, provided our meaning is clear from
context.
Definition 2.1.3. We use S(X) to denote the set of all permutations of X.
Definition 2.1.4. We use L(X) to denote the set of all total orders over
X.
Definition 2.1.5. We define a poset, or partially ordered set, to be (X,≤),
where X is a set and ≤ is a binary relation on X that is antisymmetric,
transitive, and reflexive. ≤ is called “partial” because not every pair of
elements in X needs to be related by ≤, as opposed to a total ordering
which must relate every pair.
Definition 2.1.6. For any partial order ≤x over a set X and a, b ∈ X, we
define the following additional relations over X:
a ≥x b ≡ b ≤x a,
a =x b ≡ a ≤x b and b ≤x a,
a 6=x b ≡ not a =x b,
a <x b ≡ a ≤x b and a 6=x b,
a >x b ≡ a ≥x b and a 6=x b.
We will treat these additional relations as implicitly defined, and will not
define them explicitly for each partial order individually.
Definition 2.1.7. For any poset (P,≤), a lower bound of a subset X ⊆ P is
an element a ∈ P such that a ≤ x for every x ∈ X. A greatest lower bound is
a lower bound that is greater than or equal to every other lower bound. We
denote this greatest lower bound as infP X, calling it the infimum [Bir67]
and also as
∧
P X, calling it the meet. When X contains only two elements,
we can use the meet as a binary operator:
∧
P {a, b} = a∧P b. When P is
obvious from context we will simply write inf X or
∧
X. If the infimum
exists, it is unique because posets are antisymmetric.
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Definition 2.1.8. For any poset (P,≤), an upper bound of a subset X ⊆ P
is an element a ∈ P such that a ≥ x for every x ∈ X. A least upper bound
is an upper bound that is less than or equal to every other upper bound. We
denote this least upper bound as supP X, calling it the supremum [Bir67]
and also as
∨
P X, calling it the join. When X contains only two elements,
we can use the join as a binary operator:
∨
P {a, b} = a∨P b. When P is
obvious from context we will simply write supX or
∨
X. If the supremum
exists, it is unique because posets are antisymmetric. The supremum is the
same as the infimum in the inverse order, and vice versa.
Definition 2.1.9. A poset, (P,≤), is a lattice if for any x, y ∈ P both the
meet and join of {x, y} exist. Note that the meet and join are unique by
definition (if they exist).
Definition 2.1.10. The transitive closure of a binary relation R on a set
X is the transitive relation Rt on X such that R ⊆ Rt and Rt is minimal
[LP98, p. 337].
Definition 2.1.11. For any poset (P,≤), let σ be a permutation of P . We
define the inversions of σ to be a binary relation Invσ on P :
Invσ = {(i, j) | i, j ∈ P, i < j, σ−1(i) > σ−1(j)}.
We can read i Invσ j as “i is inverted with j in σ”.
Inv is a transitive relation because for n ≥ 1 and i, k, j ∈ P we have that
if
(i, k), (k, j) ∈ Invσ
then both of the following hold:
i <k < j
σ−1(i) > σ−1(k) > σ−1(j).
And therefore (i, j) ∈ Invσ.
Definition 2.1.12. For any poset (P,≤), let σ and π be permutations of P .
We define the Kendall tau distance, K, between σ and π to be the number









0 if i and j are in the same order in σ and π
1 if i and j are in the opposite order in σ and π
Alternatively we can define the Kendall tau distance in terms of inversions:
K(σ, π) = | Invσ M Invπ |,
with M denoting symmetric difference.
Definition 2.1.13. For any poset (P,≤), let x, y ∈ P . We say that x is a
predecessor of y if x < y. We say that x is a direct predecessor of y if x is
the greatest predecessor of y.
Definition 2.1.14. For any poset (P,≤), let x, y ∈ P . We say that x is a
successor of y if x > y. We say that x is a direct successor of y if x is the
least successor of y.
In the next couple of definitions and many of the lemmas in this section,
we will be investigating lattices whose elements are permutations of a set.
That is, given a set Y , we will study some of the properties of the lattice
(S(Y ),≤).
Definition 2.1.15 (≤s). Let (Y,≤) be a poset and let X = S(Y ). We
define the partial ordering ≤s on X such that for all σ, π ∈ X:
σ ≤s π ⇐⇒ Invσ ⊇ Invπ .
In addition, if (X,≤s) is a lattice, then for any σ, π ∈ X we also have
[Mar94]:
Invσ ∧π = (Invσ ∪ Invπ)t.
Note that t indicates the transitive closure as defined in Definition 2.1.10.
Definition 2.1.16 (Xij ,≤ij). Let Y be a set, let X = S(Y ), and let (X,≤)
be a lattice. For any i, j ∈ Y we define
Xij = {x ∈ X | x−1(i) < x−1(j)}.
We then define the partial ordering, ≤ij , over Xij such that for all x, y ∈ Xij :
x ≤ij y ⇐⇒ x ≤ y
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We will now introduce some definitions having to do with social choice
theory. Throughout this paper we will use n to represent the number of
voters in an election, and m to represent the number of alternatives (candi-
dates).
Definition 2.1.17. Let C = {1, . . . ,m} be the set of all alternatives (can-
didates).
Definition 2.1.18. We define a preference list to be a total order over C.
Therefore the set of all preference lists is L(C). Alternatively we can view
a preference list as a permutation on C, and it will be obvious from context
which approach we are using.
Definition 2.1.19. We define a preference profile to be p ∈ L(C)n. And
we define P = L(C)n to be the set of all preference profiles.
Definition 2.1.20. We define a voting rule, or social choice function (SCF),
to be a function f : P → C.
Definition 2.1.21. We define an election to be simply a voting rule paired
with a profile: (f, p) where f is a voting rule and p ∈ P .
Definition 2.1.22. Let v ∈ L(C) be a preference list, and let x, y ∈ C be
two alternatives. Since v is actually a total ordering, we denote (x, y) ∈ v
by
x <v y
and if this is the case we view x as being ranked above y in v and we say
that x beats y, and denote this as
x v y.
We view x as being ranked below y in v if
x >v y
and we would say that x is beaten by y, we denote this as
x ≺v y
Definition 2.1.23. For a set of candidates D ⊆ C, for a preference list
v ∈ L(C) and a preference profile p ∈ P we denote v and p restricted to D
by v|D and p|D respectively. v|D means v after all the candidates who are
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not in D have been removed. p|D means that every preference list in p has
been restricted to D.
We will sometimes wish to restrict to every alternative except those in
D in which case we will write v|D where the universe is understood to be C.
Since we will often use restriction when comparing two preference lists
we will write x|D = y|D simply as x =D y.
Definition 2.1.24. For any sequence x, and i ∈ {1, . . . , |x|} we will denote
by x−i, x with xi removed. Therefore (x−i, x
′
i) will mean a sequence equal
to x except with x′i replacing xi.
Definition 2.1.25. A successful manipulation (or profitable manipulation)
by voter i of a SCF f at profile p is a preference list p′i such that
f((p−i, p
′
i)) i f((p−i, pi)).
Definition 2.1.26. The distance between two SCFs is defined to be the
fraction of inputs on which they differ:
D(f, g) = P(f(σ) 6= g(σ)).
When dealing with a set of SCFs, G, we take the minimum distance over all




For example, we will sometimes say that a SCF, f , is ε-far from dictatorship.
This means that D(f,DICT ) > ε, where DICT is the set of SCFs that are
dictatorships. A SCF is a dictatorship if there exists a voter whose top
ranked alternative wins regardless of the other voters’ preference lists.
Definition 2.1.27. A SCF is neutral if its result does not change with
the permutation of the alternatives. Formally, let f be a SCF, let σ be
a permutation over the set of alternatives, and let π be a function which
applies σ to each alternative in a preference list:
π(v) = (σ(v1), . . . , σ(vm)).
Then f is neutral iff
f(π(p1), . . . , π(pn)) = σ(f(p1, . . . , pn)).
Chapter 3
Background
3.1 History of Social Choice Theory
Voting systems are not a recent invention—they have been around in one
form or another for thousands of years. The earliest democracies resembling
what we use today date back to around 508 BC in Athens, Greece, and the
general idea of elections was used even before that in many other parts of
the world [Dah11]. In Athens, the assembly was the core of democracy, and
any male citizen of at least eighteen years of age was allowed to attend and
to vote [Hei52]. Athenians voted directly on public policy, instead of electing
representatives, and voting was done by majority rule. Voting was also used
outside of the assembly in a process known as ostracism which was used to
exile individuals if necessary. This was done using the plurality voting rule,
whereby each man wrote a name on a piece of pottery and the person with
the most votes was exiled [OR02].
Both the majority rule and the plurality systems used in early Greek
democracy were very simple. One drawback of these systems is that each
voter can only cast a vote for a single candidate even if, for example, there
are two candidates that he thinks are very good. In reality a voter usually
does not like one candidate and hate all the others, but usually likes various
candidates to different degrees. Therefore, a more accurate way to represent
each voter’s opinion is with a ranked list of all the candidates, which in social
choice theory is called a preference list.
In more recent centuries, voting has taken great strides forward from the
simpler methods used in ancient Greece. In 1770, Jean-Charles de Borda
proposed a voting system, known now as the Borda count, as a way of
electing members of the French Academy of Sciences [Bor81]. As a side
13
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note, although the voting system is named after Borda, it has recently been
discovered that Ramon Llull independently invented the same system even
earlier—in the 13th century [HP01]. In the Borda count system, each can-
didate receives points based on his rank in each voter’s preference list, i.e.,
a candidate will get the most points for each first place ranking, he will get
slightly fewer points for each second place ranking, and so on. The winning
candidate is the one who receives the greatest total number of points. It
was around the time Borda proposed this system that voting systems began
to be studied academically.
Majority rule, plurality, and the Borda count are a few examples of
voting systems, but there are many others. Given the large number of
voting systems, and that each system seems to have various strengths and
weaknesses, it is useful to compare them to each other. The most obvious
criterion for a good voting system is fairness [CDE+06]. It seems natural
that the best voting system is the one which best represents the constituents’
preferences. Fairness of a voting system is easy to recognize if there are
only two candidates: the candidate who is preferred by the majority of
voters should win. But with a larger number of candidates, determining the
fairness of a voting system is not so obvious.
Interest in the fairness of voting systems prompted Marquis de Con-
dorcet, a contemporary of Borda, to propose that the winning candidate
of an election be the candidate who would win a head-to-head election
against each of the other candidates (he proposed this in the year 1785).
Such a winner is known as the Condorcet winner. Unfortunately, Con-
dorcet also proved that a Condorcet winner does not always exist because
majority preferences are intransitive in elections with more than two alter-
natives [dCC85, BNM+98]. In other words, it is possible to have alternative
a (beats)b, b  c, c  a. A voting system that gives the Condorcet win-
ner if one exists is said to satisfy the Condorcet criterion. The Condorcet
criterion was one of the first formal fairness criteria, and is still widely used
today.
In 1876, Charles Dodgson (also known as Lewis Carroll) proposed a vot-
ing system, satisfying the Condorcet criterion, known as Dodgson’s method.
Dodgson’s method declares the winner to be whichever alternative can be-
come a Condorcet winner with the fewest adjacent swaps in voters’ prefer-
ence lists [Dod76]. More precisely, given the original profile p, we select a
profile p′ such that p′ has a Condorcet winner and the total Kendall tau
distance (see Definition 2.1.12) between p and p′ is minimum (compared to
all possible profiles). Then the winner is the alternative that wins under
p′. One major drawback of this method is that computing the winner is
CHAPTER 3. BACKGROUND 15
NP-hard [BTT89b].
In 1950, an American economist named Kenneth Arrow made a large
contribution to the field of Social Choice Theory with his impossibility the-
orem. Arrow was interested in the fairness of social welfare functions, which
are similar to the social choice functions except that instead of a single win-
ner, they yield a full ranking of all alternatives. Arrow’s theorem [Arr50]
(which he strengthened in 1963 [Arr12]) demonstrates that no social welfare
function can “fairly” convert the preferences of voters into a society-wide
preference list. While “fair” is clearly subjective, he gave a list of basic
properties which seem intuitively required for fairness:
Unrestricted domain (universality) All individual preferences are al-
lowed and yield a valid group preference.
Independence of irrelevant alternatives If all voters’ preferences be-
tween alternatives x and y remain the same, the group preference
between x and y is unchanged even if voters change their preferences
regarding other alternatives.
Pareto principle (unanimity) Unanimity of individual preferences im-
plies a group preference. E.g. if all individuals prefer alternative x to
y, then the group will prefer x to y.
Non-dictatorship There is no voter whose preference always dictates the
group’s preference.
Arrow proved that these properties are inconsistent: no social welfare func-
tion can satisfy all of these properties, hence, no social welfare function can
be completely fair.
The work done by Condorcet and Arrow is widely regarded as being
foundational to the modern field of social choice theory, and marks a tran-
sition from viewing social choice as a purely practical problem to a more
rigorous theoretical study.
3.2 History of Manipulation
One problem relating to the issue of fairness in social choice theory is that
of manipulation (or strategic voting or tactical voting). Manipulation is
when an individual purposefully misrepresents his preferences hoping to get
a more favorable outcome in the election. For example, if a voter knows
that his most preferred alternative has no chance of winning the election, he
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may instead say that he prefers a different alternative, so that even though
his favorite alternative cannot win, at least his second choice alternative has
a better chance of winning. For a formal definition of manipulation, see
Definition 2.1.25. Manipulation will benefit the voter but will not benefit
the society in general, because by lying about his preferences the voter has
skewed the results of the election in his favor. Therefore, it is beneficial to
search for ways to avoid manipulation in social choice.
One way to avoid manipulation would be to devise a voting rule that is
non-manipulable. Unfortunately, in 1973 the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theo-
rem was published which states that every voting rule satisfying the following
properties is subject to manipulation.
Non-dictatorship There is no voter whose preference always dictates the
group preference.
Non-imposition Every alternative has the possibility of winning.
It would certainly seem that any reasonable voting rule would need to sat-
isfy both of these criteria, hence, any reasonable voting rule is manipulable
[Gib73, Sat75, DS00]. This means that we cannot make manipulation impos-
sible via a cleverly devised voting rule—a rather disappointing conclusion.
Until this point in its history, social choice theory had been separate
from computer science—and computer science was a very young discipline
at this point. But around this time a new sub-field of social choice theory
was spawned: computational social choice theory, which seeks to use com-
puter science to solve problems in social choice theory [CELM07]. In 1989,
Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick proposed a computational barrier to manipu-
lation in voting systems [BTT89a]: instead of trying to make manipulation
impossible, they endeavored to make it computationally intractable. Even
if a profitable manipulation exists, it is of no practical use if it is computa-
tionally infeasible to find. They were able to demonstrate that while many
voting rules are easy to manipulate (a manipulation can be found in polyno-
mial time), the problem of finding a manipulation for certain scoring rules
is NP-complete. They called rules that can be manipulated in polynomial
time vulnerable, and those for which manipulation is NP-hard resistant.
This research paved the way for approaching social choice problems from
a computational footing. Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick also studied the com-
putational difficulty of finding a winner for various voting rules. For ex-
ample, they showed that the Dodgson method mentioned above [Dod76] is
actually infeasible to manipulate for the simple reason that figuring out the
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winner of the election is NP-hard. Therefore, it is not sufficient for a desir-
able voting rule to be hard to manipulate; it must also be also be efficient
to determine a winner.
In 1991, Bartholdi and Orlin [BO91] added to the above results by show-
ing that the Single Transferable Vote (STV) rule was both resistant to ma-
nipulation, and quick to determine a winner. Although STV has problems
of its own [Bra82, DK77, FB83, Hol89, Mou88], it is encouraging to see that
it is possible for an efficient voting rule to resist manipulation.
In 2002, Conitzer and Sandholm took a slightly different approach [CS02]
(which they later extended [CSL07]), studying coalition manipulation. In-
stead of a single voter manipulating an election, a group (coalition) of voters
work together to manipulate an election. This vein of research has since
been extended in various directions [CS03, EL05a, FHH06, HHR07, PRZ07,
EL05b].
The work mentioned so far which attempts to erect a computational
barrier to manipulation is encouraging, and may indeed provide ways to
prevent manipulation in voting systems. However, it deals with the worst-
case complexity of manipulation. In 2006, work by Conitzer and Sandholm
[CS06] along with that of Procaccia and Rosenschein [PR06] showed that
some manipulations that are NP-hard in the worst-case, are tractable in the
average-case (using distributions that would appear to make manipulation
more difficult). In the next few years more work was done to make this
concern even more well-founded [PR07, EHRS07]. Work along these lines
by Friedgut, Kalai, and Nisan [FKN08] in 2008, is the main inspiration for
this thesis, and has also spawned other work which will be discussed further
in the Related Work chapter.
Chapter 4
Related Work
We will now take an in-depth look at some of the results leading up to and
related to our own. For definitions of any unfamiliar notation, the reader
should refer either to the Preliminaries chapter, or to the cited work that is
being discussed. In general, an election will consist of a SCF f , a set of m
alternatives C, n voters, and a profile p ∈ L(C)n.
4.1 Elections Can be Manipulated Often
Complexity theorists have analyzed many voting systems using computa-
tional complexity as a means of inhibiting manipulation [BTT89a, HHR09].
Friedgut, Kalai, and Nisan, on the other hand, took a probabilistic approach
to this problem [FKN08]. Instead of studying worst-case manipulation, they
performed a probabilistic analysis of random manipulation. That is, instead
of a voter intelligently manipulating an election, which can be difficult in
terms of worst-case complexity, he simply chooses his manipulation ran-
domly (if his most preferred candidate is not winning already). They proved
that even a random manipulation will succeed with non-negligible probabil-
ity. This is significant because no matter how hard it is in the worst-case to
find a profitable manipulation, if it is trivial to find a random manipulation,
that could be enough.
More formally, they defined a metric, manipulation power Mi(f), of voter
i on a social choice function f to be the probability that p′i is a profitable
manipulation by voter i, where p is a profile and p′i is a preference list which
are both chosen uniformly at random. Their main result is that there exists
a constant C such that for 3 alternatives, n voters, and a neutral social
choice function f that is ε-far from dictatorship (ε > 0) then
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This means that when ε is fixed—it is fixed once a voting rule is determined—
then some voter has more than his share (a non-negligible amount) of ma-
nipulation power: maxiMi(f) ≥ Ω( 1n) [FKN08].
Besides the limitation to three alternatives, these results are incredibly
general. They rest on two main assumptions. The first is the impartial cul-
ture assumption which states that voters are independent and equally likely
to select any of the possible orderings of alternatives. In other words, votes
are selected uniformly at random. The second assumption is the neutrality
of the social choice function. The neutrality assumption was removed by
Friedgut, Kalai, and Nisan in 2011 [FKKN11].
But the restriction to three alternatives renders these results useless for
many practical applications, and it is also less satisfactory than a general
solution from a theoretical standpoint. Therefore many people have worked
to generalize these results.
4.1.1 Notation
The authors define a generalized social welfare function (GSWF) to be a
function F : Ln → {0, 1}(
m
2 ). Every pair of alternatives a, b ∈ C corresponds
to a bit output by F that tells which of the two alternatives wins. F a,b
denotes the (a, b)’th bit output by F .
If F is neutral and satisfies independence of irrelevant alternatives, then
it is determined by a single boolean function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} in the
sense that F a,b(xa,b) = f(xa,b) for any profile x. In this case the authors
write F = f⊗(
m
2 ).
4.2 A sufficient condition for voting rules to be
frequently manipulable
In 2008 Xia and Conitzer were able to prove a theorem similar to that of
Friedgut, Kalai, and Nisan for any number of candidates. But instead of
neutrality they assumed five other conditions for the voting rule [XC08]:
Homogeneity Let k ∈ N, let p be a profile of length n, and let j ∈ N such
that k ≤ j < (k + kn). A voting rule is homogeneous if f(p) = f(p′),
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where p′ consists of k copies of every vote in p:
p′j = pbj/kc.
Anonymity The result of the election does not depend on the names of
the voters. Formally, given a profile p and a permutation σ(p) then:
f(p) = f(σ(p)).
Non-imposition Every alternative has the possibility of winning.
Canceling out Adding the set of all linear orders to the votes does not
change the result. More formally, for any profile p we have that: f(p) =
f(p ∪ L(C)).
Stability Given alternatives C = {c1, c2, . . . , cm}, there exists a profile p
such that:
1. p andDm(p) are both stable, i.e., slight modifications don’t change
the winner. (See below for a definition of Dm.)
2. f(p) = c1
3. f(Dm(p)) = c2
WhereDm is defined such that ifDm(p) = p
′, then p|C\{cm} = p′|C\{cm}
and the position of cm is uniformly distributed in p
′.
For a more formal definition of Dm we must first give a couple of
preliminary definitions. First, the authors define a merging function
M : L(C)n × Cn → L(C)n such that
M((v1, . . . , vn), (i1, . . . , in)) = (M(v1, i1), . . . ,M(vn, in))
where M(vj , ij) is the preference list that results from moving cm to
the ij
th position. Second, we note that any profile p can be written as∑m!
i=1 pili where li ∈ L(C) and pi indicates how many times the linear
order li appears in p.












However, these conditions are stricter than the neutrality assumption of
Friedgut, Kalai, and Nisan, in the sense that they do not capture all of the
“common” voting rules, e.g. Bucklin.
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4.3 Frequent manipulability of elections: The case
of two voters
Around the same time Dobzinski and Procaccia published complementary
results for two voters and social choice functions satisfying unanimity (the
Pareto principle) [DP08].
They conditioned their results upon f being Pareto-optimal: if all voters
rank alternative a above b, then b is not elected. They also use a concept
of a SCF, f , being δ-strategyproof which means that f is manipulable with
probability at most δ.
Specifically, they proved the following:
Theorem 4.3.1 (Dobzinski and Procaccia). Let f be a Pareto-optimal SCF
and let n = 2, m ≥ 3, and δ < 1
32m9
. If f is δ-strategyproof then f is 16m8δ-
dictatorial.
We will translate these results into the same terms used by Friedgut,
Kalai, and Nisan so that we can easily compare their results. The fact that

















implies f is ε-far from dictatorship. And since δ < 1
32m9
, we have ε < 12m .
So we can reword their theorem as follows.
Theorem 4.3.2 (Dobzinski and Procaccia reworded). Let f be a Pareto-





then f is ε-far from dictatorship.
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The limitation of these results to two voters makes them unsuitable for
application to political elections because any political election with only two
voters seems meaningless. However, Dobzinski and Procaccia point out that
even without extending these results there are some social choice situations
which have only two voters but many alternatives—and these results are
more interesting as the number of alternatives becomes very large. One
example of this would be a couple deciding where to eat dinner. There are
only two “voters,” but there can be a huge number of alternatives to choose
from. This kind of situation can also occur among artificial intelligence
agents deciding among a vast number of alternatives.
4.4 The geometry of manipulation: A quantitative
proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
In 2010 Isaksson, Kindler, and Mossel published a brilliant generalization
of the original theorem of Friedgut, Kalai, and Nisan and even improved
slightly upon the results [IKM10]. Translating their results into the ter-
minology we have been using, they proved that for a neutral social choice
function f with m ≥ 4 alternatives and n voters that is ε-far from dicta-
torship, a uniformly chosen profile will be manipulable with probability at







This bound allows the manipulating voter to randomly permute his entire
preference list, which is the case considered by Friedgut, Kalai, and Nisan.
However if we restrict him to permuting only four adjacent alternatives,
Isaksson, Kindler, and Mossel showed that the bound becomes polynomial







Isaksson, Kindler, and Mossel used purely geometric and combinatorial
methods to achieve their results. One of the foundational techniques they
employed was the canonical path method [JS93]. Given a graph G, the
canonical path method attempts to give a lower bound on the “surface area”
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of a subset of vertices, A. Surface area is defined as the number of vertices in
A that have an edge to at least one vertex outside of A. Given two vertices
x, y such that x ∈ A and y /∈ A, the authors call the path between them
the canonical path, and clearly this path must contain at least one surface
vertex. Then by proving that each surface vertex lies on at most r canonical
paths, the surface area of A is bounded below by |A||A|r because the total
number of total canonical paths is |A||A|.
The graph used by Isaksson, Kindler, and Mossel is very similar to the
one used by Friedgut, Kalai, and Nisan. It is also similar to the one used for
the results in this thesis, except that ours is directed, and is missing certain
edges.
Next the authors define the boundary of f with respect to alternatives
a, b as
Ba,bi (f) = {(x, x
′) | f(x) = a, f(x′) = b,∀j 6= i : xj = x′j}.
For any distinct alternatives a, b, c, d the authors construct canonical paths
between Ba,bi and B
c,d
j such that each path passes through a manipulation
point. These paths are called manipulation paths.
The authors define manipulation paths between pairs of profiles in Ba,bi
and Bc,dj . In the first half of the path we will preserve the order of a, b, while
in the second half of the path we will only modify the order of a, b and not
any other alternatives. The length of the manipulation path will be 2n− 3
because we are not modifying the last two indices. For any pair of profiles
(x, x′) ∈ Ba,bi and (z, z′) ∈ B
c,d
j the manipulation path is formally defined
as follows. The manipulation path is of the form:
(x(0), x′(0)), . . . , (x(n−2), x′(n−2)), (z(n−2), z′(n−2)), . . . , (z(0), z′(0))
such that (x(0), x′(0)) = (x, x′) and (z(0), z′(0)) = (z, z′). For all k ∈ {0, . . . , n−
2}, and all s ∈ {0, . . . , n− 2} such that s 6= k we restrict the path so that:
(x(k)s , x
′(k)
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Note that by the pairwise notation for defining a path: (x(0), x′(0)), (x(1), x′(1)),
we mean that we have two paths of equal length: x(0), x(1) and x′(0), x′(1).
Additionally, by the notation xk =D zk we mean that the preference lists
xk and zk have the same ordering for every alternative in the set D (see
Definition 2.1.23).
We will perform a small example to illustrate how the above rules work
together in forming the manipulation path. We use n = 4 voters which
means we will have a manipulation path of length 2n − 3 = 5. Here, for
simplicity, we show only x and z but the example for x′ and z′ is exactly
the same.
step 0 1 2 2 1 0
1st index x1 y1 y1 y1 y1 z1
2nd index x2 x2 y2 y2 z2 z2
3rd index x3 x3 x3 z3 z3 z3
4th index x4 x4 x4 z4 z4 z4
Here yi for i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} represents the result of Equation 4.3 (or 4.4 de-
pending on whether it’s on the x side or the z side). Therefore yi can be
defined as
xi ={a,b} yi ={a,b} zi
or in other words we get yi by taking zi and swapping a, b if necessary to
ensure that their order is the same as in xi. A visual representation of this
example, with arbitrarily chosen preference lists, is illustrated in Figure 4.1.
We will now go through the example table step by step for the x side
(left half); the z side is simply a mirror image of what happens in the x side.
At step 0 we have x(0) = x because we specified above that our initial value
was (x(0), x′(0)) = (x, x′). At step 1 we first use Equation 4.1 to essentially
copy over every index from step 0 except index 1 (because it is the kth index
during this step). We then apply Equation 4.3 to index 1 to get y1. At step
2 we again use Equation 4.1 to copy over every index from step 1 except for
index 2 for which we use Equation 4.3 to get y2. We don’t modify the last
two indices because these are the only ones on which x, x′ and z, z′ differ:
recall that (x, x′) ∈ Ba,bn−1 and (z, z′) ∈ B
c,d
n .
Lemma 4.4.1 (Lemma 5.1 of Isaksson, Kindler, and Mossel). For any SCF
f , distinct i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n} and distinct alternatives a, b, c, d ∈ C there exists
a mapping h : Ba,bi (f)×B
c,d
j (f)→M where
M = {x ∈ P | f is manipulable at x}
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such that for any x ∈M
|h−1(x)| ≤ 2n(m!)n+4
Proof. Without loss of generality, let i = n − 1 and j = n. We construct a
manipulation path between (x, x′) ∈ Ba,bi (f) and (z, z′) ∈ B
c,d
j (f). Notice
that (x, x′) takes the values (a, b) while (z, z′) takes the values (c, d) because
f(x) = a, f(x′) = b, f(z) = c, and f(z′) = d. Our claim is that along this
manipulation path is an edge ((u, u′), (v, v′)) such that either
1. at least one of u, u′, v, v′ is a manipulation point
2. f takes on at least three values on the points u, u′, v, v′.
In explanation, notice that there are at most three possible situations, and
at least one of the above claims holds for each:
• On the first half of the path the value of the pair changes from (a, b)
to something else. If the first value changes to b or the second value
changes to a then we have a manipulation point because the ranking of
a, b doesn’t change on the first half of the path. Otherwise the values
change to something other than a or b, so f takes at least three values
at this point.
• On the second half of the path the value of the pair changes from (c, d)
to something else—moving from the end towards the middle. If the
first value changes to d or the second value changes to c then we have
a manipulation point because the ranking of c, d doesn’t change on
the second half of the path. Otherwise the values change to something
other than c or d, so f takes at least three values at this point.
• The middle edge (x(n−2), x′(n−2)), (z(n−2), z′(n−2)) connects a pair with
values (a, b) and (c, d). Clearly f takes on at least three values at this
point.
Notice that u, u′, v, v′ agree in all but two indices which will be either
{n−1, k}, {n, k}, or {n−1, n} depending on whether (u, u′), (v, v′) is on the
first half, on the second half, or is the middle edge of the path respectively.
For example, if (u, u′), (v, v′) is on the first half of the path u, u′ and v, v′ will
both differ on the n− 1 index because both pairs are in Ba,bn−1. Additionally,
u, v and u′, v′ will each differ on kth index because of the definition of the
manipulation path.
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We claim that there exists a manipulation point h((x, x′), (z, z′)) = y
which only differs from u, u′, v, v′ on two indices. If Case 1 above holds,
then we can let y be whichever one of u, u′, v, v′ is a manipulation point.
If Case 2 holds then we apply the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem to a
restricted version of f , which we will call f ′, which is f restricted to the
two indices on which u, u′, v, v′ differ. We call these indices k, p. First the
authors define a mapping g : L(C)2 → L(C)n which maps profiles from f ′
to f .
g(x)q = uq ∀q /∈ {k, p}
g(x)k = x1
g(x)p = x2.
The authors define the set of alternatives to be C where |C| = m and they
define f ′ : L(C)2 → C such that
f ′(x) = f(g(x)).
If we apply the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem [Gib73, Sat75] to f ′ we will
see that f ′ is manipulable since it is not a dictator and it takes on at least
three values (because Case 2 holds). Therefore some x is a manipulation
point for f ′, so g(x) is a manipulation point of f . And in fact g(x) differs
from u, u′, v, v′ on only two indices so y = g(x).
The final step in the proof is to count the maximum number of pairs
that could have lead to the manipulation point y and that will be simply
the number of inverses of the mapping function: |h−1(f)|. To begin with,
we know that the length of the manipulation path between (x, x′) and (z, z′)
is 2n − 3. This gives us 2n − 3 possibilities for (u, u′), (v, v′). In addition,
given y there are at most (q!)2 possibilities for u because it differs from y on
at most two indices. We find that there are at most (q!)n possibilities for x
and z as follows. For any k ∈ {1, . . . , n} we will have either:
• uk = xk if u is on the first half of the path and k is an index that
hasn’t been updated—by update we mean that it has been made to
conform to xk ={a,b} uk ={a,b} zk. In this case there are q! possibilities
for zk because it can be any preference list.
• uk = zk if u is on the second half of the path and k is an index
that hasn’t been updated. In this case there are q! possibilities for xk
because it can be any preference list.
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• xk ={a,b} uk ={a,b} zk if k is an index that has been updated. In this
case there are q!2 possibilities for xk because only the order of a, b needs
to match uk, and there are 2 possibilities for zk because the order of
every alternative besides a, b needs to match uk.
No matter which of the previous cases hold for each k, the total number of
possibilities for x and z is still bounded above by (q!)n.
Lastly, given x and z there are at most q! possibilitites for each of x′
and z′ respectively, since edges of the border set differ only in one index.
Summing these we get:
|h−1| ≤ (2n− 3)(q!)2(q!)n(q!)(q!)
|h−1| ≤ (2n− 3)(q!)n+4.
One of the open problems of Friedgut, Kalai, and Nisan was finding a
way “to replace the neutrality condition with the weaker ‘correct’ condition:
being far from having a range of size at most 2. [FKN08]” In 2011, Friedgut
et al. successfully achieved this themselves with the help of one additional
author [FKKN11]. Most of the work required to replace the neutrality con-
dition focuses on the first step of the original theorem, and their results are
as follows.
Theorem 4.4.2. There exist universal constants C,C ′ > 0 such that for
every ε > 0 and any n the following holds:
• If F is an SCF on n voters and three alternatives, such that the dis-
tance of F from a dictatorship and from having only two alternatives
in its range is at least ε, then
n∑
i=1
Mi(F ) ≥ C · ε6.




Mi(F ) ≥ C ′ · ε2.
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Mossel and Rácz [MR12] took ideas from these two proofs and created
a unified proof with the same results as Isaksson, Kindler, and Mossel, but
without the neutrality constraint. This is a very useful result and is as
follows.
Theorem 4.4.3. Suppose we have n ≥ 1 voters, m ≥ 3 alternatives, and a
SCF f : L(C)n → C satisfying D(f,NONMANIP) ≥ ε. Then









for some polynomial p, where σ ∈ L(C)n is selected uniformly. In particular,




An immediate consequence is that









for some polynomial q, where σ ∈ L(C)n is uniformly selected, and σ′ is
obtained from σ by uniformly selecting a coordinate i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, uniformly
selecting j ∈ {1, . . . , n − 3}, and then uniformly randomly permuting the
following four adjacent alternatives in σi : σi(j), σi(j + 1), σi(j + 2), and
σi(j + 3). In particular, the specific lower bound for P(σ ∈ M4(f)) implies










Above, the distance between SCFs is defined as in Definition 2.1.26.
NONMANIP is defined to be the set of SCFs which are either dictators
or take at most two values. Finally, M(f) denotes the set of manipula-
tion points of the SCF f, and for a given r, let Mr(f) denote the set of
r-manipulation points of f (we only allow permuting r adjacent alternatives
instead of the entire preference list).






































































































































































(x (1), x ƍ(1))
(x(2), xƍ(2))
(z (1), z ƍ(1))














Figure 4.1: A visual example of a manipulation path.
Chapter 5
Results
In this chapter we will attempt to generalize step 3 of Friedgut, Kalai, and
Nisan by way of generalizing their Lemma 6, Lemma 7, and Lemma 8.
However, we will begin the chapter with some general lattice theory results
that we will need later on in the chapter.
5.1 Lattice Theory
We are not aware of any existing proofs of these lemmas, but some of them
are fairly elementary and seem to us to be broadly applicable.
First we will prove, in three steps, that our inversion lattice (ordered by
≤s; Definition 2.1.15) remains a lattice when we identify two elements that
are adjacent in the order ≤ (Definition 2.1.16). Recall from Definition 2.1.9
that in order to be a lattice the join and meet must exist for every pair of
elements. Therefore Lemma 5.1.1 proves that the join exists, Lemma 5.1.2
proves that the meet exists (with similar reasoning), and Proposition 5.1.3
combines both lemmas to prove that our structure is indeed still a lattice.
Lemma 5.1.1. Let (Y,≤) be a poset and let X = S(Y ). Let (X,≤s) be
as in Definition 2.1.15. Let Inv be the inversion binary relation (Definition
2.1.11) over Y , and let ∨ and ∨ij denote the join in (X,≤s) and (Xij ,≤ijs )
(Definition 2.1.16) respectively. Then for any i, j ∈ Y , if i is either a direct
successor or a direct predecessor of j according to ≤, it holds that for all
x, y ∈ Xij:
x∨ y is defined =⇒ x∨ij y is defined.
Proof. Choose arbitrary x, y ∈ Xij . Assume x∨ y is defined. Let z = x∨ y.
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Then z is an upper bound of {x, y}:
z ≥s x and z ≥s y.
And z is the least upper bound of {x, y}. For every a ∈ X:
(a ≥s x and a ≥s y) =⇒ z ≤s a.
Since x ∈ Xij , then (i, j) /∈ Invx. Since z ≥s x, then (i, j) /∈ Invz, so
z ∈ Xij . By definition z ≥s x =⇒ z ≥ijs x and z ≥s y =⇒ z ≥ijs y.
Therefore z is an upper bound of {x, y} in Xij .
For any a ∈ Xij if a is an upper bound of {x, y} in Xij then clearly a
is also an upper bound of {x, y} in X. Therefore z ≤s a, so z ≤ijs a, which
means z = x∨ij y. So clearly x∨ij y exists.
Lemma 5.1.2. Let Y be an ordered set and let X = S(Y ). Let (X,≤s)
be a lattice with ≤s defined as above (Definition 2.1.15). Let Inv be the
inversion binary relation over Y as defined above (Definition 2.1.11). Let
∧ and ∧ij denote the meet in (X,≤s) and (Xij ,≤ijs ) respectively. Then for
any i, j ∈ Y , if i is either a direct successor or a direct predecessor of j
according to ≤, it holds that for all x, y ∈ Xij:
x∧ y is defined =⇒ x∧ij y is defined.
Proof. Choose arbitrary x, y ∈ Xij . Assume x∧ y is defined. Let z = x∧ y.
Then z is a lower bound of {x, y}:
z ≤s x and z ≤s y.
And z is the greatest lower bound of {x, y}: for every a ∈ X:
(a ≤s x and a ≤s y) =⇒ z ≥s a.
We now show that z ∈ Xij . Since z = x∧ y, it holds that Invz = (Invx ∪ Invy)t
(Definition 2.1.10, Definition 2.1.15) [Mar94]. Because x, y ∈ Xij we know
that (i, j) /∈ (Invx ∪ Invy). Therefore, in order to have (i, j) ∈ (Invx ∪ Invy)t
we would need to have
(i, k1), (k1, k2), . . . , (kn−1, kn), (kn, j) ∈ Invx ∪ Invy
for n ≥ 1 and k1, . . . , kn ∈ Y . But that is impossible because i is either
a direct successor or a direct predecessor of j. Therefore (i, j) /∈ Invz, so
z ∈ Xij .
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By definition
z ≤s x and z ∈ Xij =⇒ z ≤ijs x
and
z ≤s y and z ∈ Xij =⇒ z ≤ijs y.
Therefore z is a lower bound of {x, y} in Xij .
For any a ∈ Xij if a is a lower bound of {x, y} in Xij then clearly a
is also a lower bound of {x, y} in X. Therefore z ≥s a, so z ≥ijs a, which
means z = x∧ij y. So clearly x∧ij y is defined.
Theorem 5.1.3. Let Y be a set and let X = S(Y ). Let (X,≤s) be a lattice
with ≤s as in Definition 2.1.15. Let Inv be the inversion binary relation
over Y as in Definition 2.1.11. Then for any i, j ∈ Y , if i is either a direct
successor or a direct predecessor of j according to ≤s, it holds that (Xij ,≤ijs )
is a lattice.
Proof. We know that x∨ y is defined and x∧ y is defined because (X,≤s)
is a lattice. Therefore by Lemma 5.1.1 and Lemma 5.1.2 we have x∨ij y
is defined and x∧ij y is defined respectively. So (Xij ,≤ijs ) is a lattice, by
definition of a lattice.
Now we will show that a cross-product of lattices is also a lattice. For
example, suppose we have the lattice in Figure 5.1. The top element is the
greatest, and the arrows show the “less than” relationship between elements.
Each column of numbers represents a ranking of alternatives 1, 2, 3 in which
we don’t care about the relationship between alternative 1 and 2 so we
simply replace alternative 2 with 1 in the ranking. All this aside though,
this proof is valid for any lattice.
If we were to make that lattice into a 2-dimensional “grid” it would look
like Figure 5.2. This would be the case if we only had two voters (n = 2).
Proposition 5.1.4. Let (X,≤) be a lattice. Let Xn be the set of all n-tuples
of elements of X. Let ≤n be defined as: for all x, y ∈ X
x ≤n y ⇐⇒ ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, xi ≤ yi.
Then (Xn,≤n) is a lattice.
Proof. By definition of a lattice, (Xn,≤n) is a lattice if for any two elements
s, t ∈ Sn, s∨ t is defined and s∧ t is defined.
































































Figure 5.1: A single dimension of lattice.
First, we show that s∨ t is defined. We define u ∈ Xn such that ui =
si ∨ ti, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and we show that u = s∨ t. Because ui = si ∨ ti, we
have
ui ≥ si and ui ≥ si
so
u ≥n s and u ≥n t
meaning that u is an upper bound for s and t. Suppose there is some v ∈ Xn
which is also an upper bound for s and t. Then ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n} we have
vi ≥ si and vi ≥ ti
so since ui = si ∨ ti, then ui ≤ vi. Therefore u ≤n v, i.e. u is the least upper
bound of {s, t}.
Second, it follows by analogy to the above proof for s∨ t, that s∧ t is
defined. Therefore, s∨ t is defined and s∧ t is defined, so (Xn,≤n) is a
lattice.
5.2 Main Theorem
Friedgut, Kalai, and Nisan’s main theorem is proved in three steps; the
first two are already general, and hold for any n,m ∈ N+. Therefore, to























































Figure 5.2: A 2-dimensional version of the lattice from Figure 5.1.
generalize the main theorem we need only generalize the third step, and
therefore this third step is our main theorem. This step is comprised of
Lemma 6, Lemma 7, and Lemma 8 which we will generalize one at a time.
The lemma we will generalize is:
Lemma 5.2.1 (Lemma 3 of Friedgut et al.). For every SCF f on three





Which we will generalize as:
Theorem 5.2.2 (Main Theorem). For every SCF f on m alternatives and
every a, b ∈ C:




For the rest of the proof we will fix a SCF, f , and two alternatives
a, b ∈ C.
CHAPTER 5. RESULTS 35
5.3 Generalized Lemma 6 of Friedgut et al.
For any preference profile p ∈ P there are (m!2 )
n profiles x such that x|{a,b} =
p|{a,b}. This is because there are m! possible preference lists; half of them
will have the preference between a and b that agrees with p|{a,b} and half
will disagree. This gives m!2 possible preference lists for each voter, so there
are (m!2 )
n profiles comprised of these preference lists.
Definition 5.3.1. Let a, b ∈ C be the first two alternatives, let p ∈ L(C)n
be a preference profile, and let X ⊆ L(C)n. We define
A(p,X) = {x ∈ X | x|{a,b} = p|{a,b}, f(x) = a}
B(p,X) = {x ∈ X | x|{a,b} = p|{a,b}, f(x) = b}.
When we do not explicitly specify X we assume X = L(C)n:
A(p) = A(p, L(C)n)
B(p) = B(p, L(C)n).
Before we state Lemma 5.3.2, recall the definition ofMa,b(f) from Friedgut,
Kalai, and Nisan [FKN08]:
Ma,b(f) = P(f(p) = a, f(p′) = b)
where p, p′ are chosen at random in L(C)n with p|{a,b} = p′|{a,b}.
Therefore we can rewrite Ma,b(f) as follows.











where q is chosen uniformly at random.





is the probability that a randomly chosen profile, p, satisfying p|{a,b} = q|{a,b}
also satisfies f(p) = a. This is because there are (m!2 )
n profiles that agree
with q|{a,b}, and |A(q)| is the number of those for which the outcome is a.






is the probability that a randomly chosen profile, p′, satisfying p′|{a,b} =
q|{a,b} also satisfies f(p′) = b.
Since p|{a,b} = q|{a,b} and p′|{a,b} = q|{a,b}, clearly we have that p|{a,b} =








5.4 Generalized Lemma 7 of Friedgut et al.
We now attempt to relate Mi(f) to A and B.
Recall the ordering, ≤s, which was defined in Definition 2.1.15. We know
that (L(C),≤s) is a lattice by the following. First, L(C) is the set of all
total orderings of C, which is isomorphic to the set of all permutations of
C. Second, ≤s is the weak Bruhat order (also known as the weak order of
permutations). The weak Bruhat order applied to the set of all permutations
is a lattice [Bjö84], so (L(C),≤s) is a lattice. This is useful to note now,
and will be invoked to help prove Conjecture 5.5.4.
We have defined (L(C),≤s) to be a lattice, but for the following defini-
tion, and for later in the chapter we will treat it as a graph with L(C) being
the set of vertices, and ≤s being the set of edges, oriented so that edges go
from greater nodes to lesser nodes.
Definition 5.4.1. Let p ∈ L(C)n. We define the upper edge border of A(p),
denoted ∂A(p), to be the set of directed edges whose tail is in A(p) and whose
head is not in A(p). We will use the notation (x−i, xi, x
′
i) as a shorthand to
denote the edge ((x−i, xi), (x−i, x
′
i)). Formally, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}:













CHAPTER 5. RESULTS 37
We define the upper edge border of B(p) analogously.
Before we continue we will prove a preliminary lemma that we will use
later in our proof. This lemma will show that each edge in (x−i, xi, x
′
i) ∈
∂iA(p) ∪ ∂iB(p) corresponds to a successful manipulation.
Lemma 5.4.2. Let p ∈ L(C)n, and let i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Then each (x−i, xi, x′i) ∈
∂iA(p) ∪ ∂iB(p) corresponds to at least one successful manipulation.





For (x−i, xi, x
′
i) ∈ ∂iA(p), we know that f((x−i, xi)) = a and f((x−i, x′i)) =
t for t ∈ C\{a}. If t xi a then x′i is a successful manipulation of (x−i, xi).
Otherwise, a xi t. If this is the case, then we know that (a, t) /∈ Invxi , and
because xi <s x
′
i we have (a, t) /∈ Invx′i , which means a x′i t. Therefore xi
is a successful manipulation of (x−i, x
′
i).
And analogously for (x−i, xi, x
′
i) ∈ ∂iB(p), either x′i is a successful ma-
nipulation of (x−i, xi) or xi is a successful manipulation of (x−i, x
′
i).
We now generalize Lemma 7 of Friedgut, Kalai, and Nisan. Their original
lemma is:





This lemma relates Mi(f) to the upper edge border defined above, and










Proof. First, recall the definition of Mi(f): given a profile p ∈ P and a vote
p′i ∈ L(C) chosen uniformly at random, Mi(f) is the probability that p′i is
a successful manipulation of p by voter i. Therefore to lower bound Mi(f)
we start with p and p′i chosen uniformly at random. We can think of these
as two distinct profiles, p and p′, where p′ = (p−i, p
′
i).
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Clearly p−i|{a,b} = p′−i|{a,b}, but we will have pi|{a,b} = p′i|{a,b} only with
probability 12 , and we condition the following on this being the case. So we
assume that p|{a,b} = p′|{a,b}.
By Lemma 5.4.2, each (x−i, xi, x
′
i) ∈ (∂iA(p) ∪ ∂iB(p)) corresponds to
at least one successful manipulation. Note that if (x−i, xi, x
′
i) ∈ ∂iA(p) then
(x−i, x
′
i, xi) /∈ ∂iA(p).
Therefore we can lower bound the probability that p, p′ is a manipulation,
i.e. Mi(f), by the probability that an edge is in ∂iA(p) ∪ ∂iB(p).




but all edges in ∂iA(p) ∪ ∂iB(p) must agree with p|{a,b}. The total number
















Since ∂iA(p) and ∂iB(p) are disjoint, no edge can be in both sets and so we
have
















· E [|∂iA(p)|+ |∂iB(p)|]
Note that we can sum the probabilities for ∂iA(p) and ∂iB(p) because they
are disjoint by the definition of the upper edge border; an edge cannot
satisfy both (x−i, xi) ∈ A(p) and (x−i, xi) ∈ B(p) simultaneously because if
f((x−i, xi)) = a then f((x−i, xi)) 6= b and vice versa.











· E [|∂iA(p)|+ |∂iB(p)|] .








· E [|∂iA(p)|+ |∂iB(p)|] .
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Summing over i we get the following corollary.












5.5 Generalized Lemma 8 of Friedgut et al.
In this section we will fix a profile p, and for the sake of readability we use






We also recall that (L(C)n,≤n) is our n-dimensional lattice as defined in
Proposition 5.1.4, and that A and B reside in this space:
A ⊆ L(C)n
B ⊆ L(C)n
We now generalize Lemma 8 of Friedgut, Kalai, and Nisan. Their original
lemma is:








Our generalization of the above lemma is Conjecture 5.5.4, but we must
do a little bit of setup before we are ready to prove it. First we define an
algorithm to consolidate A into A′. We define A′ to be a consolidation of A
in Algorithm 5.5.1.
Note that since we are dealing with a lattice, the max function in Al-
gorithm 5.5.1 can yield multiple results. In this case we assume that one
result is chosen at random.
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Algorithm 5.5.1 Consolidate A′
A′ ← A
for i = 1→ n do
for d ∈ L(C)n do
D ← {x ∈ L(C)n | x−i = d−i}
F ← D ∩A′
for a ∈ F do
a′ ← max≤n(D\A′)




Figure 5.3 gives visual example which may aid in understanding the
above algorithm. It shows key steps in the process on a very small two-
dimensional example lattice.
We do the same to consolidate B into B′.
One of the goals of this consolidation is to achieve A′ ⊆ B′ or B′ ⊆ A′.
While the result of this algorithm comes close to satisfying those criteria, it
does not hold in all cases; see Open Problem 5.5.2.
Open Problem 5.5.2. When using the algorithm above, we do not neces-
sarily have A′ ⊆ B′ or B′ ⊆ A′. We could modify the algorithm naively so
that it satisfies those criteria, but then it would become difficult to prove our
second condition:
|A′\A| ≤ |∂A| and
|B′\B| ≤ |∂B|.
Therefore, we leave the modification of this algorithm to achieve A′ ⊆ B′ or
B′ ⊆ A′ as our first open problem.
We will continue with the proof as if we do have A′ ⊆ B′ or B′ ⊆ A′, so
that if this problem is resolved then the proof will be complete.
We will now prove the following lemma.
Lemma 5.5.3.
|A′\A| ≤ |∂A| and
|B′\B| ≤ |∂B|
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Proof. First, we show that for every a′ ∈ A′\A, we have an edge in ∂A.
Let a′ ∈ A′\A. The above algorithm only adds elements to A′ in the
innermost for loop, and since that for loop iterates once for every a ∈ A(D)
we know that for every a′ we have a corresponding a. Since a′ ∈ A′\A, we
know that a 6= a′. Since a′ ← max≤n(A(D)\A′) and a 6= a′, we have that
a <n a′. According to the algorithm, a, a′ ∈ D which means a−i = a′−i.
Therefore, (a−i, ai, a
′
i) ∈ ∂iA by the definition of ∂iA.
Therefore, every profile in A′\A corresponds to at least one profile in
∂A, so we know that
|A′\A| ≤ |∂A|.
The same reasoning can be used to show that:
|B′\B| ≤ |∂B|.
And now we are ready to prove the final lemma in this section:







Proof. Since for any two votes v1, v2 ∈ A ∪ B we have v1|{a,b} = v2|{a,b} we
can define a new set
P ′ = {x ∈ P | x|{a,b} = p|{a,b}}
and view A, B, A′, and B′ as residing in P ′ without losing any information.
This is because, by definition, the elements of these sets agree with p|{a,b}.
Clearly |P ′| = (m!2 )
n.
For any vote v ∈ P ′, let EA′ be the event that v is in A′, and let EB′ be
the event that v is in B′. Then
P (EA′ ∩ EB′) = P (EA′)P (EB′ |EA′)
Clearly
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Since either A′ ⊆ B′ or B′ ⊆ A′, we have
P (EB′ |EA′) ≥ P (EB′)
Therefore
P (EA ∩ EB) ≥ P (EA)P (EB)


















However A and B are disjoint so
A′ ∩B′ ⊆ (A′\A) ∪ (B′\B)
which, along with Lemma 5.5.3, completes the proof as follows
|A′ ∩B′| ≤ |A′\A|+ |B′\B|















5.6 Finished Step 3 of Friedgut et al.
Lemma 6, 7, and 8 fit together as follows. First we define the variables
L6, L7, and L8 to be variable values that multiply each of the lemmas
respectively. The values of these variables will change depending on the
value of m, so we evaluate the lemmas in terms of these variables to be
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more general. We can define the lemmas in terms of these variables:
Ma,b = E[|A||B|] · L6 lemma 6






· (|∂A|+ |∂B|) ≥ |A||B| conjecture 8
Now we can solve for the result of step 3.
Ma,b = E[|A||B|] · L6 by lemma 6










If we can fully generalize this step and capture all of the vi’s our results
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5.7 Main Theorem of Friedgut et al.
Now we can use Friedgut, Kalai, and Nisan’s generalized steps 1 and 2 along
with our generalized version of step 3 to prove a general version of their main
theorem. We will restate their generalized lemmas from step 1 and 2.
Lemma 5.7.1 (Lemma 1 of Friedgut et al.). For every fixed m and ε > 0
there exists δ > 0 such that if F = f⊗(
m
2 ) is a neutral IIA GSWF over m
alternatives with f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}, and ∆(f,DICT ) > ε, then F has
probability of at least δ ≥ (Cε)bm/3c of not having a Generalized Condorcet
Winner, where C > 0 is an absolute constant.
Lemma 5.7.2 (Lemma 2 of Friedgut et al.). For every fixed m there exists
δ > 0 such that for all ε > 0 the following holds. Let f be a neutral SCF
among m alternatives such that ∆(f,DICT ) > ε. Then for all (a, b) we
have Ma,b(f) ≥ δ.
And we restate our generalized version of Friedgut, Kalai, and Nisan’s
Lemma 3.
Conjecture 5.7.3 (Lemma 3 of Friedgut et al.). For every SCF f on m
alternatives and every a, b ∈ A, Ma,b ≤
∑
iMi ·m!
With these three lemmas we can now prove a generalized version of
Friedgut, Kalai, and Nisan’s main theorem.
Conjecture 5.7.4 (Theorem 1 of Friedgut et al.). There exists a constant
C > 0 such that for every ε > 0 the following holds. If f is a neutral SCF
for n voters over 3 alternatives and ∆(f, g) > ε for any dictatorship g, then





Proof. Lemma 5.7.2 gives us
Ma,b(f) ≥ δ
and by substituting the result from Lemma 5.7.1 for δ we get
Ma,b(f) ≥ δ ≥ (Cε)bm/3c
Ma,b(f) ≥ (Cε)bm/3c
CHAPTER 5. RESULTS 45
We then relate Ma,b to Mi by Conjecture 5.7.3
n∑
i=1
Mi(f) ·m! ≥Ma,b(f) ≥ (Cε)bm/3c
n∑
i=1












































































































































































































































































































Figure 5.3: Example of lattice shifting algorithm.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
We have attempted to prove the following main result in order to extend
the results of Friedgut, Kalai, and Nisan in a straightforward manner, and
along the same lines of reasoning as the original proof. Our main theorem
is
Conjecture 6.0.5 (Main Result). There exists a constant C > 0 such that
for every ε > 0 the following holds. If f is a neutral SCF for n voters






Unfortunately, due to time constraints and unforseen difficulties, we were
unable to prove (or disprove) Conjecture 5.5.4 because of the problem noted
in the attempted proof for that lemma. We conjecture that this can be
proven without many changes to our attempted proof, and we leave this as
an open problem.
Since our main result relies on Conjecture 5.5.4, we have only been able
to prove the following two lemmas.
Lemma 6.0.6. Let C be a set of alternatives. Let a, b ∈ C be any two
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Even though we were not able to complete the proof of Conjecture 5.5.4,
we made progress towards that end, and we were able to provide a detailed
explanation of the difficulties we ran into. We have also shown that if
Conjecture 5.5.4 can be proven, then our main result will follow.
6.1 Open Problems
In closing we would like to point out a few potential areas of further research
that may follow from this thesis. There are any number of directions that
future research can take, but these are some of the most relevant questions
that we have omitted, either intentionally or unintentionally, from this work.
Therefore, we leave the following open problems.
1. As discussed above, we leave the completion of the proof of Conjecture
5.5.4, by resolving Open Problem 5.5.2, open for further investigation.
2. Throughout this thesis we have been concerned only with average-case
complexity based on a normal distribution of votes. This is common
practice and it is a useful distribution, but in real-world elections the
distribution is very rarely a normal distribution, so we leave the task
of investigating the impact of a more realistic distribution open for
further research.
3. Our bounds are certainly not tight, and neither are the bounds of
Mossel and Rácz [MR12]. It would be very useful to find tight bounds,
and we leave this as our third open problem.
4. This work deals with a lower bound on average case manipulability,
but some subsets of SCFs may be close to this lower bound, while
others may be significantly higher. It would be useful to investigate
the average case manipulability of certain subsets of SCFs to see how
close they are to this generic lower bound. This is one of the open
problems stated by Mossel and Rácz [MR12]. We restate it here for
emphasis, and leave this as our final open problem.
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[HP01] G. Hägele and F. Pukelsheim. Llull’s writings on electoral
systems. Studia Lulliana, 41(97):3–38, 2001.
[IKM10] M. Isaksson, G. Kindler, and E. Mossel. The geometry of
manipulation: A quantitative proof of the
gibbard-satterthwaite theorem. In Foundations of Computer
BIBLIOGRAPHY 53
Science (FOCS), 2010 51st Annual IEEE Symposium on, pages
319–328. IEEE, 2010.
[JS93] M. Jerrum and A. Sinclair. Polynomial-time approximation
algorithms for the ising model. SIAM Journal on computing,
22(5):1087–1116, 1993.
[Kun80] K. Kunen. Set theory: An introduction to independence proofs,
volume 102. Elsevier Science, 1980.
[LP98] R. Lidl and G. Pilz. Applied abstract algebra. Springer Verlag,
1998.
[Mar94] G. Markowsky. Permutation lattices revised. Mathematical
Social Sciences, 27(1):59–72, 1994.
[Mou88] H. Moulin. Condorcet’s principle implies the no show paradox.
Journal of Economic Theory, 45(1):53–64, 1988.
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